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Abstract 
 
Governance systems which are based on assumptions of purposive-rational action have 
received significant criticism. For example recent quality and performance frameworks 
of the English NHS have tended towards incentives and sanctions, and have been 
critiqued in terms of both the logic on which they are run as well as a lack of evidence for 
their success. Yet the limitation of much of these critical appraisals is the failure to 
propose concrete, empirically-grounded alternatives. Thus as a means of adding to the 
literature, this discussion paper seeks to perform three functions. Firstly it reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature around governance in the English NHS as a basis of 
understanding the limitations of this ‘standards and sanctions’ dominated system. 
Secondly, it discusses findings from research into the governance system applied in 
Tuscany, Italy as evidence of the effectiveness of using the reputation of professionals 
and departments as a basis of facilitating quality development. Implications – for the 
English NHS and governance more widely – are then considered. A theoretically 
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grounded alternative to purposive-rational approaches based on a more normative 
oriented understanding of human action and the ‘civilising processes’ of moral obligation 
is accordingly outlined.  
 
 
Keywords: Clinical governance; Italy; moral obligation; performance; trust.   
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Economic and socio-political pressures towards greater levels of efficiency, quality and 
performance are common across late-modern welfare states, yet are manifest in a range of 
different forms (Burau and Vrangbaek, 2008). The prefix late- is applied here to denote a sense 
of institutional crisis or strain (Habermas, 1976). Such tension is apparent in an economic sense 
through the basic economics of problem faced by healthcare systems (rising  demand, 
expectations and potential treatments versus limited resources) and welfare states more generally 
(Bonoli et al., 2000). There is also a crisis of legitimation faced by healthcare institutions 
regarding specific failures of individual practitioners (Alaszewski, 2002), a change in the way 
the professions are perceived and trusted by the public (Calnan and Rowe, 2008), and a 
heightened awareness of the uncertainty and fallibility of expert knowledge systems (Beck, 1992) 
– not least that of medicine (Alaszewski and Brown, 2007).  
Alongside these crises and partly in response to them, a ‘New’ Public Management 
(NPM) has emerged over the past quarter century (Hood, 1995; Gruening, 2001).  A more 
explicit accountability of performance – and the introduction of levers to effect an on-going 
development of quality, efficiency and organisational learning – are central ‘doctrines’ of this 
approach yet the NPM-umbrella includes a vast array of methods and strategies. The governance 
of quality and performance thus varies across different public sector organisations within 
individual states and indeed between countries (Hood, 1995; Ferlie et al., 1996). Sectors and 
states differ in the extent to which the NPM paradigm has been predominant as well as in terms 
of the particular paths chosen.  
The teleology and effectiveness of these different NPM strategies have received 
significant attention, not least those relating to the governance of quality and performance (e.g. 
Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1995; and in relation to healthcare: Scally & 
Donaldson, 1998; Ferlie and Shortell, 2001). Typically, empirical work in this area has been 
carried out through in-depth evaluations/appraisals of specific individual systems, thus allowing 
only tentative inferences to be made about the likely effectiveness of alternatives. Comparative 
studies on the other hand do exist, however those which compare a number of countries (for 
example, Burau and Vrangbaek, 2008) unavoidably lack the detailed assessment of nuanced 
frameworks (Clarke et al., 2007), developments over time (ibid), and analyses of “the meanings 
embodied in political activity” (Bevir et al., 2003:193). The specific, local manifestations of this 
latter feature are especially salient for understanding the governance of healthcare systems, and 
especially the reactions of healthcare professionals working within such policy frameworks 
(Gray and Harrison, 2004; Bevan and Hood, 2006a; Brown, 2008). To this end, useful examples 
of more detailed (small-n) comparative work within the domain of healthcare also exist (e.g. 
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Moran, 1999); though due to the publication date of this study Moran does not specifically 
address the more recent performance frameworks which explicitly focus on clinical quality.  
The purpose of this paper is to develop understandings of what constitutes effective 
governance of quality in healthcare – both theoretically and empirically. This will be undertaken 
through a discursive comparison of tendencies within the English and Tuscan public healthcare 
systems. The lack of systemically comparable data precludes the possibility of a more rigorous 
comparative study. Nonetheless this discussion paper draws together research into governance in 
the English NHS, and evaluations of quality mechanisms in Tuscany, as a basis for a broader 
consideration of different approaches to developing quality. In so doing the paper also points 
towards the possibility of more systematic, in depth comparative research in the future.     
Whilst the size of these two systems is quite different, there are a number of important 
similarities between the two systems which assist their comparability: both are publicly funded 
by the tax payer; both have been engulfed in particular concerns about their efficiency and 
effectiveness (Smith et al., 2001; Formez, 2007) within a wider circumspection of the public 
sector (Moran, 2003; Rapporto CEIS Sanità, 2008); both utilise gate-keepers as one means 
towards efficiency; and both have faced apparent crises of trust (Smith, 1998; Nuti and Vainieri, 
2009). As a result of the above, and of more specific relevance for this article, both systems have 
embarked on policy ventures towards assuring the quality and performance of their healthcare 
provision – on a system-wide basis, at the level of local healthcare organisation (Primary Care 
Trust or Local Health Authorities), and indeed at that of the individual professional.  
The format of a more typical comparative paper might consider data in directly relating 
and contrasting aspects of the two governance systems, as a means of coming to a conclusion as 
to one being more effective in some areas than the other and understanding why. This article 
however will follow a somewhat different approach – beginning instead with the assumption that 
the English system of quality development and assurance has been largely ineffective in 
achieving significant change in a wide number of areas. The first section will use the existing 
literature to develop an understanding of these limitations, whilst also noting areas of 
achievement. This more nuanced account is imperative, both in offering a more balanced and 
accurate description as well as drawing on examples of ‘good practice’ as a means of 
establishing the refinements necessary for effective governance.  
The second section will discuss findings from research into the effectiveness of a 
different form of governance within the Tuscan healthcare system. If the English system can be 
generalised as operating through standards, directives and sanctions (at least as it is experienced 
by the professionals working within it), then the Tuscan alternative can be said to function 
around heightening the visibility of the work of local teams. Correspondingly an onus is placed 
on the reputation of the local organisations and individual professionals (Nuti, 2008) – not least 
their fiduciary role of acting in the best interests of patient care and public funding. A third 
‘discussion’ section will then extrapolate from these findings a number of theoretical themes 
around individual behaviour, organisational functioning and social cohesion – applying these to 
develop a theorisation of effective governance in terms of legitimacy (Parsons, 1949), the 
relational qualities inculcated (Black, 2008), and the corresponding feature of normative 
obligation (Elias, 1982). It is argued that the role of reputation in creating normative obligation 
(Brown, 2008; Nuti, 2008) towards quality and performance – a ‘civilising process’ (Elias, 1982) 
– is more effectual than appealing to purposive-rational tendencies through stipulations and 
sanctions.  
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The limitations of quality frameworks in the English NHS: multiple distractions from 
'quality' and learning 
 
Notions of quality assurance are intrinsic to the very practice and refinement of medicine 
(Maxwell, 1984) and indeed were clearly visible within initial processes of professionalisation 
(Donabedian, 1978). Post-1997 health policy in the UK has made this quality imperative more 
explicit and indeed has sought to place quality and the development of effective performance at 
the very centre of NHS policy and organisational considerations (Department of Health, 1997; 
1998; Scally and Donaldson, 1998). The lynchpin of this quality strategy is clinical governance – 
“a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the 
quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in 
which excellence in clinical care will flourish” (Department of Health, 1999: 4).  
Clinical governance essentially operates through the setting of standards and 
corresponding methods of verification to ensure these standards are met (Halligan and 
Donaldson, 2001). Thus the ‘goals’ can be identified as National Service Frameworks (strategic 
long-term goals) and a vast array of protocols and guidelines as disseminated by the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, the various Royal Colleges and other elite 
professional bodies. The ‘incentives’ within recent governance arrangements have entailed 
systems of monitoring and surveillance in accordance with performance frameworks. These were 
designed to ensure the meeting of standards and the following of procedures – working at the 
local organisational level as well as through external processes such as those enacted by the 
Healthcare Commission.  
 
Prima facie the quest for quality in the NHS would appear to function through delegated 
autonomy, and yet such is the ‘comprehensive and systematic’ manner in which performance and 
other outcomes are monitored that many have characterised the developments as movements 
towards a ‘machine bureaucracy’ (Flynn, 2002: 168). Regardless of differences between the 
rhetoric of governance and its manifestations in praxis, there has been a general consensus that 
these quality frameworks have had a decidedly limited impact (Smith et al., 2001; Thomas, 2002; 
Degeling et al., 2004; Neale et al., 2007; Gask et al., 2008). Hence while many healthcare 
professionals are in accord with the general aim of pursuing quality (Shakeshaft, 2008), there are 
a number of attributes within and around clinical governance which limit its effect on 
professional action and therefore clinical performance.  
One means of understanding these weaknesses is the multiple and conflicting priorities of 
governance systems. Quality is most usefully understood as a multi-dimensional concept 
(Maxwell, 1984) and indeed frameworks require professionals not only to serve many masters, 
but moreover to pay heed to some (most notably efficiency) more than others (Klein, 1998). 
Sheaff and Pilgrim (2006) argue that the efficiency concerns reinforced within purchaser-
provider quasi-markets obstruct and distract from organisations’ learning function, thus 
rendering quality (in its wider sense) compromised as a result. In this sense ‘complexity and 
contradictory processes’ (ibid: 27) may well consume the attention and efforts of healthcare 
professionals in a Simonian sense (Simon, 1971), and thus act to undermine quality at its most 
fundamental – that of patient-centred care (Brown and Calnan, 2010).  More specifically, the use 
of monitoring and surveillance may develop distracting and therefore problematic tendencies at 
three distinct levels: the extent of information produced (Degeling et al., 2004); the focus of 
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what is being measured and moreover which measurements/targets are related to sanctions 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006a); the very nature of measurement itself (Brown, 2008).  
These latter two aspects are inherently linked, in that some aspects of quality are by their 
very nature easier to quantify, and therefore monitor, than others (Kennedy, 2004). This variation 
in generalisability/visibility within the organisation,  and moreover the politicisation of certain 
sub-facets of quality (such as waiting times), means that certain such components come to be 
disproportionately significant in considerations of quality (Brown and Calnan, 2010). Perverse 
incentives are likely to develop around these (Bevan and Hood, 2006a) given their bureaucratic 
importance. It is this innate disjuncture between quality which is bureaucratically significant (for 
the administrative ‘system’) and that which is clinically significant in a more holistic sense 
(within the interactive experiences of clinicians), which is at the heart of the limitations of the 
governance system. Approaches to governance have typically failed to capture holistically, 
proportionately and therefore accurately what quality really represents to professionals (Degeling 
et al., 2004). This lack of synchronicity, and thus legitimacy, undermines their support and 
cooperation in the system.  
It is vital at this stage to underline that clinical governance, as it has been applied in the 
English NHS, is far from wholly deficient. Whilst the analysis above has been set out as a basis 
for understanding the limitations of this governance, and its apparent lack of effectiveness in a 
generalised sense, it would be overly schematic to ignore areas (both geographical and within 
certain clinical specialisms) where significant enhancements in quality have been achieved. 
Arguably it is primary care where levels of professional cooperation (McDonald et al., 2009) and 
improvements in quality outcomes (Campbell et al., 2005) have been more visible. Although it 
must be recognised that these outcomes are understood within a predominantly bio-medical 
paradigm and therefore can be criticised in terms of broader notions of what is holistic practice, 
this paradigm is nonetheless that which is most capable of developing consensus and support 
amongst the medical professionals whose cooperation is vital.  
Aside from the financial remuneration which is attached to Quality Outcomes Framework 
(QOF) in General Practice, the ways in which quality is assessed are highly intricate (135 
separate indicators – 2007/8) and holistic (reflecting clinical and organisational priorities, patient 
experience and the provision of additional services). In this sense the monitoring and 
surveillance applied is capable of reflecting the complexities and multi-dimensionality of 
professional performance and therefore minimising the gap between bureaucratic significance 
and clinical significance as discussed above. Moreover, whilst the extent of monitoring and 
recording is considerable, the office-based environment of General Practice is perhaps more 
conducive to allowing GPs to deal with the bureaucratic burden in a way which minimises its 
interference on the holistic practice of clinical interactions (Checkland et al., 2008).  
 General practice aside, there have also been a number of more recent innovations within 
the governance of more acute healthcare service provision in the English NHS – often in 
response to many of the failings noted above. ‘Star ratings’ enacted a ‘naming and shaming’ 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006b: 419) approach which functioned alongside a threat of dismissal of the 
senior managers of poorly performing trusts, as well as the ‘carrot’ of autonomy for those rated 
highly within the system. This framework has been criticised however for the extent to which a 
small number of relatively crude, performance-oriented indicators either neglected large 
elements of practice or elicited gaming behaviour and dysfunctional outcomes (Bevan and Hood, 
2006a).  
 If the star ratings approach – with its threats and rewards focused on administrators – can 
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be understood as a hierarchical-bureaucratic approach to quality, then more recent ventures such 
as the ‘Advancing Quality’ initiative in North West England and the national Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework (Department of Health, 2008) tend 
towards market-oriented payment-by-results format, as applied within the QOF example 
discussed above. CQUIN involves rewards which are agreed locally by services and their 
commissioners within the quasi-market of the purchaser-provider system. The relatively small 
financial rewards used within ‘Advancing Quality’ – and the initially successful impact of 
comparing trusts in a more nuanced, patient-focused way (Kmietowicz, 2008) than enabled by 
Star Ratings – points towards the potential utility of social/reputational drivers as a method of 
enhancing and assuring quality.  
 
 
The Tuscan experience: the Performance Evaluation System as a collaborative learning 
tool 
 
In contrast to the English NHS, recent organisational tendencies within Tuscany's 
healthcare system reflect an emphasis placed on cooperation between the key actors in the 
system rather than on competition via systems of purchasers-providers. Following this trend, 
when considering how governance systems might be established to enhance quality, it was seen 
as important to plan and develop a framework that could be shared and owned by the various 
health authorities themselves as well as the regional administration.  
In order to support the running of the health system as a whole, as well as its specific 
local components, a method of highlighting areas of excellence and of improving areas shown to 
be critical or weak (Jones, 2000) has become a key feature of the Performane Evaluation System 
(PES). Through a mutually agreed set of indicators (as opposed to top-down stipulation), PES 
has sought to start a ‘best practice' enhancement process amongst the local healthcare institutions 
via a system of benchmarking (McNair and Leibfried, 1992).  
The inauguration of PES in 2004 saw the introduction of a multidimensional 
measurement system in order to assess and monitor the Health Authorities (HAs) of the Tuscany 
Region - consisting of 12 Local Health Authorities (LHAs) and 4 Teaching Hospitals (THs). PES 
consists of 50 measures, made up of more than 130 indicators overall, classified in six 
dimensions of assessment, including: population health; regional health strategies; quality; 
patient satisfaction; staff satisfaction; efficiency/financial performance. In order to simply and 
graphically represent the performance of each HA, a “target” chart with the six dimensions 
represented was designed, divided into five bands associated with different levels of performance. 
An indicator with a high score is displayed as close to the centre (dark green), and one with a low 
score is displayed as far from the centre (red).  
The application of PES has been appraised as facilitating a number of improvements 
across the Tuscan healthcare system (Censis, 2008; Neri, 2009).  Its utility suggests that targets 
can usefully change the behaviour of individuals and organisations if applied in the right manner 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006a) – vitally where there is a high level of congruence between what is 
bureaucratically significant and that which is clinically significant. That the benchmarking and 
advancement process associated with PES is based on local involvement and agreement, and 
moreover encourages local services to learn from the data (of their own outcomes as well as 
those of their colleagues) in understanding what 'good' or 'best' practice might look like, would 
appear to be contributing factors to the framework's success. After four years of PES being in 
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operation, and in its running alongside a payment reward system for CEO’s (of HAs), 
improvements were achieved in most of the indicators monitored: over 50% of the 130 indicators 
registered improvements year-on-year (Nuti, 2008).  
Although the use of monetary incentives would seem to signal the existence of a market-
linked management of quality (as opposed to hierarchy and trust), the size of these financial 
rewards makes evident their relatively minor nature. Process evaluation of PES suggests that the 
greatest incentive is through local health authorities wanting to improve their publicised 
performance in relation to other HAs, especially where these authorities are rated as very weak. 
An annual publication of HA rankings within the regional press – with a naming of CEOs 
according to levels of achievement – creates high incentives to avoid being listed ‘worst’, while 
regular meetings of CEOs, where indicators are reviewed, allow for a sharing of good-practice 
and a peer-recognition of improvement. Moreover, explanations for improvements are provided 
amidst the scrutiny of an audience of peer CEOs and this helps ward against gaming (Nuti et al., 
2008). These interactive means of checking are much more effective at illuminating gaming 
practice than the mere use of distant auditing methods (Bevan and Hood, 2006a).  
Indicators that received more attention were those concerning quality and appropriateness. 
This choice is explained by some empirical studies on the Tuscan PES data. This research 
highlights that financial sustainability is more closely linked to the capacity to control 
appropriateness and quality than efficiency (Nuti et al., 2010, Nuti et al., 2011).  
Other Italian regions joined the Tuscan PES in 2008. The 2007-2008 data shows that only 
the Tuscany Region, the region that had included the indicator in its PES since 2005, 
significantly improved its performance while the other regions, which more recently introduced 
PES, registered a stable performance (Nuti et al., 2012). 
In analysing the functioning and utility of PES in more detail, at least five significant 
factors become apparent: 
The first element to be considered is the participation of the clinical professionals and 
local managers within the wider process (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995; Jones and Dewing, 
1997)– PES was in fact designed and developed in close collaboration with healthcare 
professionals and managers (Nuti et al., 2009). It is important that all actors within the healthcare 
system – clinicians, local managers and regional administrators – participate and share their 
opinions in developing the evaluation indicators.  This collaborative and inclusive basis is vital 
in order to avoid the risk that local managers may manipulate data, or that they will not use the 
performance evaluation system because they do not believe in the relevance and significance of 
the indicators proposed by the regional government. On-going training activities4 involving HA 
coordinators, senior- and middle-management have facilitated the development, diffusion, 
comprehension and refinement of PES. This input further stimulates ownership.   
 The second point is that benchmarking helps local organisations to learn from others' 
experiences - overcoming the limitations of merely self-referential evaluations and driving 
improvement even in the absence of a marketised form of competition. The information 
produced within PES and represented uniformly has enabled an efficient and constructive 
comparison amongst the system’s local health authorities (though the comparability of budget 
allocations remains problematic). This has made it possible to highlight the aspects where 
problems are of a regional nature, and those which derive from an individual authority’s 
behaviour. For instance, if a particular indicator shows a negative performance for all the local 
health authorities surveyed then this is clearly a more general problem that requires attention at a 
regional level. When, instead, performance varies greatly between authorities, it becomes clear 
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that some authorities could learn from others and that collaboration (via 'good practice' sharing) 
between them could help to overcome certain localised issues of poor performance. In this way 
the means of assuring performance is intrinsically and closely tied to the vital role of local HAs 
as learning organisations, rather than the more conflicting priorities which exist across many 
NHS contexts (Sheaff and Pilgrim, 2006).   
 The third factor is the strong emphasis on reputation. According to some research (Mannion 
and Davies 2002; Hibbard et al., 2003; Hibbard et al., 2005), the key driver of changing 
performance in the health sector is the threat of reputational damage. The Tuscan experience 
suggests the utility of comparing performance amongst individual HAs, but above all through 
highlighting and communicating the good results obtained by the ‘best practice’ examples. In 
harnessing this lever of reputation, the Tuscany Region decided not only to publish the levels of 
performance achieved but also to show how HAs improved their performance when these 
developments are more pronounced. Performance indicators are monitored every three months – 
being presented and discussed at individual meetings between the Regional Health Councillor 
and the CEOs of each LHA. These meetings have become forums of knowledge development 
and dissemination, where successful approaches are able to be discussed, adopted and transferred 
to other settings. It also works as a deterrent factor to certain gaming phenomena (Nuti et al., 
2008).   
The fourth hallmark of the PES is the graphical reporting system: its 
striking visual approach is easy to understand (Bevan 2009). This effective graphic 
representation is a way to empower the transparency of the system that can be understood also by 
citizens. In fact all data and results are available to citizens through a publicly accessible website 
and a report published annually. In this way citizens become involved in the accountability 
process as to how public resources are used to deliver value for patients/service-users. The extent 
to which citizens are willing and/or able to use this information may be contested and should not 
simply be assumed (Entwistle et al., 1998), nonetheless the visibility and transparency of these 
data publications within the public sphere amplifies the reputation-based effect (and 
corresponding moral obligation) on the behaviour of LHAs and the system as a whole.  
Finally, it is vital that the relative effectiveness of PES is not understood as a 
disembodied or a-political process. Other measurement tools, developed in the Tuscan healthcare 
systems with the involvement of clinicians in designing it, have not been implemented because 
the pressure and support from senior managers was lacking (Cinquini & Vainieri, 2008). These 
are determining factors in the favourable outcomes of the implementation and use of 
measurement systems. In this context, a coherent political long-termism, personified by certain 
innovative advocates (e.g. the Regional Health Councillor) has been vital to the ‘change 
management’ that has been enacted over a number of years. This political commitment is visible 
in the funding which sustains the ‘learning organisation’ aspects of quality development. This 
sits in contrast to quality frameworks in the English NHS, where the introduction of institutional 
apparatus has not been mirrored by substantive improvement/learning implementation on the 
ground (Freeman and Walshe, 2004; Sheaff and Pilgrim, 2006).  
Given the features described, some limitations continue to emerge:  
The aspects that PES takes into account include, among others, efficiency, quality and 
appropriateness, but still there is too little evidence regarding ‘outcomes’. Further development is 
required in order to identify and share outcome indicators.    
Regarding the balance of PES indicators, a further weak point also lies in the fact that 
PES only measures primary care activities thorough indirect information - since data from 
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primary care physicians are not available. This limitation results in a lack of data (and 
understanding) relating to clinical pathways.  
Although the Tuscan PES comprehends a large number of indicators and covers many 
aspects of healthcare services, there is still the risk of cream skimming and the risk of a lack of 
attention in sectors which are not monitored by PES. 
 
 
Discussion: From purposive-rationality to fiduciary-obligation - via a social and ‘civilising’ 
process 
 
 
Table 1 (below) briefly summarises some of the main characteristics of governance systems in 
Tuscany and England as discussed above. Given the peculiar caveat of QOF, and its relative 
success, this is discussed as a separate case to the more common format of quality governance in 
the NHS. The systems are briefly described under three of the key facets of governance 
legitimation which have emerged as salient in the analysis above: whether the system was 
imposed from the top-down or consulted from the bottom-up; the extent to which the indicators 
applied reflect the subtleties and holistic imperatives of clinical practice; and (as potentially 
influenced by both of the above) the extent to which the format, and the incentives applied, is 
compatible with  (or enhanced by) professional norms and values.  
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Table 1 – Summary of findings  
 
Type of governance framework: Prevailing 
quality  
framework in 
English NHS 
Quality and 
Outcomes 
Framework – 
English NHS 
Performance 
Evaluation System 
- Tuscany 
Characteristics of the 
governance 
framework: 
Enactment -  as 
bottom-up 
(consent) or top-
down? 
Top-down Top-down (high 
levels of 
remuneration linked 
to QOF may act to 
win over clinicians) 
Bottom-up / 
consensus based 
 
 
 
Intricate and 
holistic indicators?   
 
congruence between 
bureaucratic and 
clinical significance  
 
 
 
Varies and 
gradual 
refinement – 
but typically 
criticised as 
crude 
 
 
 
Intricate and holistic   
 
(135 separate 
indicators – includes 
‘patient experience’ 
and ‘holistic care’) 
 
 
 
Intricate and 
holistic  
 
(130 indicators – 
across 6 
dimensions of 
healthcare 
provision) 
 
 
Compatible with, 
and makes use of, 
norms and values? 
 
 
Typical 
findings 
suggest 
problems in 
both senses 
 
 
Financial incentives 
– but often 
compatible with 
holistic narrative 
 
 
Uses reputation as 
a form of 
normative 
obligation. Modest 
incentives for 
CEOs. 
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At the centre of the apparent success of both PES and QOF is their relative legitimacy amongst 
the professionals whose practice they seek to influence. All forms of governance and 
accountability mechanisms must be perceived as legitimate if they are to be effective (Black, 
2008) and this might most simply be understood as - the behaviour which governance seeks to 
elicit being congruent with prevailing norms and values (Parsons, 1949). Or, as has been 
articulated above, where there is minimal distance between what is bureaucratically and 
clinically ‘significant’. Whereas QOF (like PES), through its reflection of the complexities of 
clinical work and relative compatibility with narratives of holistic practice (Checkland et al., 
2008), is thus able to achieve such legitimacy – the limitations of governance in many other 
areas of the NHS might be most effectively understood through a basic lack of ownership 
(Brown, 2008): governance fails to reflect quality in its more complete sense (as understood by 
professionals) and therefore the juncture, as referred to above, between bureaucratically 
significant quality and clinically significant quality undermines legitimacy.  
More profoundly still, human conduct and social cohesion is not explainable merely via 
responses to threat of sanctions and/or rewards in an instrumental sense (Locke, 1960; Habermas, 
1987). Rather, non-contractual, normative and affective aspects are decisive in influencing 
individual behaviour and shaping organisational dynamics (Durkheim, 1984), and thus 
governance is always inherently relational (Black, 2008). Yet by appealing simply to purposive-
rational action (of reaching targets and avoiding sanctions) and ignoring the relational, socialised 
basis of organisational order – and moreover clinical work – clinical governance often detaches 
compliance (with governance) from the norms, values and relations of meeting patient needs and 
driving professional morale  (Brown, 2008). QOF can also be seen, in part, as appealing to 
purposive-rational interests in its payment-by-results format. Yet its multi-faceted and intricate 
approach to quality would nonetheless seem to facilitate a narrative of holism amongst GPs 
(Checkland, 2008) – i.e. instrumental and normative interests remain compatible with one 
another (Brown 2008).  
Where professionals see such divergences between the satisfying of bureaucratic 
stipulation and the moral value of their work, the former comes to be perceived as a-moral. 
Therefore no normative obligation exists towards cooperation, and ignorance or subversion of 
governance becomes likely (ibid). In this light it is apparent that effectual governance of 
healthcare work is that which is able to reflect the holistic, clinical interests of patients – as 
perceived by professionals – and therefore achieve legitimacy. Moreover the most effective and 
efficient systems will be those which account for, and ideally function through, relationships and 
normative obligation. For an on-going monitoring and surveillance is not only ineffective, 
through only appealing to purposive-rational motives, but moreover is highly costly. The 
opportunity costs of healthcare professionals’ time in complying with governance recording 
systems are also considerable (RCN, 2008).  
The financial incentives attached to QOF may well have assisted the engagement and 
relative lack of resistance the framework has encountered. Yet the economic burden of the new 
General Medical Services contract on the NHS, of which QOF is a costly part, would seem to 
limit the transferability of this approach to other contexts. Means of managing transactions which 
apply normative obligation through trust and cooperation, as opposed to financial incentives or 
bureaucratic stipulation, are cheaper (Arrow, 1974; Fukuyama, 1995) as well as more effective in 
managing and refining knowledge within learning organisations (Adler, 2001). Accordingly this 
final section will close by proposing that an effective and efficient governance system should be: 
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professional-led; based on cooperation rather than monitoring and sanctions; and one which 
facilitates the role of normative obligation in ‘civilising’ clinical work. These three components 
would help assure a high level of congruence between bureaucratic and clinical significance (see 
Brown and Calnan, 2011 for broader discussion of this framework).  
As already clarified, governance systems which are truly professional-led will be more 
likely to acquire legitimacy through the on-going involvement (design, application and 
refinement) and corresponding ownership of the professionals over whom control is sought. 
Growing out of this, the role of professionals in developing and refining how quality and 
performance are assessed will ensure the system’s accuracy in reflecting the subtleties of clinical 
practice and the wider, holistic patient experience. Rhetoric behind clinical governance in the 
UK pays lip-service to such ‘grassroots’ participation, but mere involvement is not sufficient 
(Degeling et al., 2004). Local professionals must participate in the design of how their practice is 
assessed and provide on-going input into such a system in order to ensure continuing legitimacy 
(congruence between the bureaucratic and the clinical) and thus commitment.  
It is partly in this sense that cooperation, rather than standards and sanctions, is a 
powerful mode of obligation because norms and values (within the social group) are a 
compelling force on human praxis which is driven by far more than purposive-rational interests. 
Systems based on this latter logic tend towards the de-moralisation of work in the sense of 
alienation and an undermining of control (Brown, 2008). In contrast systems rooted around the 
former are more effective at refining, sharing and applying expertise in knowledge intensive 
organisations such as medicine (Adler, 2001).  
This advocating of governance formats which are professional-led and cooperative 
should not be mistaken as suggesting a return to the previous system which was noted to have 
failed in England in the late-1990s (Smith, 1998). The previous system functioned behind a 
shroud of relatively blind trust placed in the broader profession (Dixon-Woods, 2009); hence 
there was only limited effect of socialised, normative obligation in that a professional’s value 
was attributed through group status as opposed to individual performance. By making individual 
or local-team work more visible through using outcomes data (as deemed appropriate by local 
stakeholders), the socialised influence of norms and values is made more potent and is effective 
on the individual clinician. CQUIN has been noted as one notable (local) example in England 
where such an approach is evident.  
The crucial contrast with the much of the current system in England would be the 
absence of sanctions. Less than ideal performance would instead engage discussions as to how 
improvements could be reached and thus promote learning and cooperation rather than defensive 
practice and gaming. It is in this sense that the role of the social (as opposed to the bureaucratic) 
in governing and civilising behaviour becomes apparent. The visibility of the self (or the team) in 
the public sphere, in terms of reputation, therefore generates “‘continuous reflection, foresight 
and calculation, self-control, precise and articulate regulation of one’s own effects’ (Elias, 1982: 
271).  
Although empirically grounded, this paper is very much a discussion piece. More 
substantive research is required to explore the themes raised here and in particular the various 
caveats and nuances (variations within services between effective and poor outcomes; differing 
relations with managers; cultures within specialties more or less conducive to quality foci; and so 
on) which undoubtedly exist across the English and Tuscan systems. The development of 
research designs and conceptual frameworks which are capable of comparing (quantitatively and 
qualitatively) the perceptions, behavioural changes, and longer-term outcomes across different 
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approaches to healthcare governance are necessary. These might even be possible based on 
existing secondary data, as an alternative to new primary research.  
Based on the discussions above, it could also be contended that – given the centrality of 
prevailing norms and values to the successful legitimation of governance frameworks – there 
may be a degree of cultural specificity to the effectiveness of normative obligation (and 
governance more generally) within the contexts discussed (Burau and Vrangbaek, 2008). The 
dominance of certain forms of habitus within specialisms (e.g. General Practice) or regions (e.g. 
Tuscany) may make forms of coping (McDonald, 2009) or cooperation more likely; thus 
emphasising the utility of further, socio-culturally sensitive, comparative research.  
 
 
Endnotes 
 
 The population size of England is slightly over 50 million, whilst Tuscany’s is marginally below 3.5 million.   
 Though a novel policy in its explicit centring round quality, clinical governance is best viewed not so much as a 
new, post-1997 creation but rather emerging out of several pre-existing trends. Some of these emerged within the 
new public management of the 1980s and 90s (Flynn 2002; Brown 2008). 
 Indeed such has been the success of GPs in developing quality and meeting QOF targets that the remuneration of 
GPs, via points which are related to the indicators, has put considerable financial strain on the NHS. Whilst this is 
evidence of naivety in terms of economic planning, it can be considered further evidence of quality improvements. 
 Not only is QOF a form of performance related pay, but it is also associated with a new GP contract which has led 
to improved working conditions (e.g. reductions in work outside office hours) (Whalley et al., 2008). This may also 
impact on the popularity of the new ‘system’ and corresponding legitimacy.  
 Interestingly little data exists as to the precise costs of implementing quality frameworks across the NHS. It is likely 
though that these are significant and underestimated (Walshe et al., 2003). 
 The use of the term civilising is applied not to suggest a current predominance of barbarism, but rather a process 
towards more modern and systematically enlightened practice of clinical work and organisation. 
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